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Abstract 
Increasingly,  lobbying  groups  are  subject  to  transparency  requirements,  obliging  them  to 
provide detailed information about their business. We study the effect this transparency 
policy  has  on  the  nature  of  lobbying  competition.  Under  mild  conditions,  mandated 
transparency leads to an increase in wastefulness of lobbying competition and a decline in 
expected allocative efficiency. Hence we identify a negative side-effect of transparency policy, 
which also has implications for various other fields such as political campaigning or firm 
competition. 
Keywords 
Transparency Policy, Rent-seeking Contests, Information Disclosure, Value of Ignorance. 
JEL Classification 
 D72, D82, L12. 1 Introduction
On March 20, 2009, U.S. president Barack Obama released a presidential memorandum on the
subject of ensuring responsible spending of Recovery Act funds. In this he promises to disclose
all lobbying contacts on the distribution of Recovery Act funds within three business days to the
public. In reaction to this, on April 7, 2009 the Sunlight Foundation, a nonproﬁt, non-partisan
organization promoting government openness and transparency, presented its own proposal for
real-time lobbying disclosure on their blog.1 After meeting with a lobbyist, the government
agency immediately submits a summary of the meeting details through a standardized platform,
and the results are accessible to the general public on the internet. Instead of learning about
them every quarter year, journalists as well as the public will have an immediate basis to evaluate
the decisions of policymakers and the inﬂuence they were facing. But this is not the only eﬀect
of increased transparency. Real-time disclosure also directly informs the competing lobbyists
about their opponent’s interests and doings. In this paper we show how this can have bad
consequences. Lobbying competition can become more ﬁerce and less eﬃcient.
This paper addresses the following questions. What information policy is optimal, if a
competitor in a contest can decide and commit to acquire relevant information about his rival
or disclose his own private information to the rival? Do the competitors agree on information
transmission? What is the eﬀect of mandatory disclosure policy on the outcome of competition?
Our main results are:
• Strong transparency policy in a competitive environment can have detrimental side eﬀects
for society. We identify conditions where it leads to increased competition and less eﬃcient
outcomes.
• Decentralizing information disclosure instead is often beneﬁcial. We identify conditions
where the competing groups will agree to transparency decisions, beneﬁting both the
competitors and society at large.
• When outcomes are very sensitive to (lobbying) expenditures (e.g. luck and outside factors
become less important), decentralized agreement becomes unlikely. In these circumstances,
neither mandatory disclosure nor a laissez-faire transparency rule are optimal.
Our main results may be illustrated through the following simple example: Two competitors
are vying for some prize. One of them (the incumbent) has a known valuation for the prize
while the valuation of the other (the newcomer) is (potentially) unknown, and may be either
high or low. The key intuition underlying all of the results stems from the following observation:
Competition is ﬁercest when the two rivals have similar valuations and milder when valuations
1http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2009/04/07/a-vision-of-real-time-lobbying-disclosure/.
1diverge. Consider ﬁrst the decision to acquire information. While better information helps the
incumbent to choose an optimal eﬀort level, if the decision to acquire information is revealed,
then the newcomer will also respond. When the incumbent has a relatively high valuation,
he is better oﬀ not acquiring information since, if this information reveals that his opponent
has a high valuation, competition is sharpened while if the opponent is revealed to have a low
valuation, then the incumbent can no longer credibly commit to deter his opponent through
overinvestment. Thus, information acquisition is unambiguously bad. On the other hand, when
the incumbent has a relatively low valuation, acquiring information is beneﬁcial as it reduces the
eﬀorts of the opponent regardless of valuation—in the case of high valuation, it stems from the
revealed divergence of values while in the case of low valuation, it stems from discouragement.
Now, consider the decision of the newcomer to disclose information. If the newcomer faces
an incumbent with a relatively high valuation, competition will be ﬁerce if he discloses a high
valuation and mild when his value is revealed to be low. Since not disclosing leads to an
intermediate level of competition, low valuation newcomers prefer to reveal while high valuation
ones do not. The reverse is true when the newcomer faces a relatively weak incumbent: high
valuation newcomers prefer disclosure while low valued ones prefer opacity. How does this
translate into a newcomer’s ex ante disclosure policy? His expected payoﬀs are dominated by
how he fares when he has a high valuation since this raises both the beneﬁts and chances of
winning the contest. As a result, the optimal policy is to disclose when the incumbent has a
relatively high value and to remain opaque when the incumbent has a relatively low value.
This means that the competing parties agree on disclosure when the value of the incumbent
is relatively high, and on non-disclosure otherwise. Thus, a central insight to emerge from this
analysis is that, despite the fact that the two sides have opposing interests in that both want
to win, they agree that less “eﬀort”, ceteris paribus, is good. Since information sharing aﬀects
the degree of competition, there is scope for agreement. Furthermore information sharing not
only inﬂuences the degree of competition but also the eﬃciency in allocating the prize to the
party who values winning most. Agreement on reduced competition often also leads to greater
eﬃciency in allocating the prize. When information sharing is optimal, it results in greater
separation in the eﬀorts of the two parties and, as a result, the prize is awarded to the higher
valued party more often. Likewise, when information sharing is not optimal, it again results
in greater separation of eﬀorts. Thus, endogenous information sharing leads to ex ante Pareto
gains. In this circumstance, mandatory disclosure policies can increase wasteful competition
and distort prize allocations.
Consider some other examples of competitive environments in which transparency policy is
relevant. In the U.S., transparency in political campaigning is regulated by the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA). It requires candidates to disclose sources of campaign contributions and
campaign expenditure quarterly. Not only is the public opinion aﬀected by disclosure of this
2information but also the campaign decisions of competing candidates and hence competition.
Disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures conveys information about the depth of
ﬁnancial support of a candidate and this in turn inﬂuences the decisions of the opposing candi-
dates and hence the election outcome. This paper suggests mandating transparency can make
candidates compete more ﬁercely and thus competition more wasteful. Or consider competi-
tion between ﬁrms. In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as well as the
Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) regulate ﬁrms’ disclosure of ﬁnancial information.
This information is not only accessible by stakeholders of a ﬁrm but also by its competitors,
which has implications for competition between ﬁrms if private information is revealed. Our
results shed light on how mandatory disclosure inﬂuences competition in winner-take-all mar-
kets, or more generally markets where competition can be represented by a contest. This is for
example the case in advertising intensive markets, like the market for soft drinks.
The paper is organized as follows. Next we survey the related literature. Section 2 introduces
the model. Section 3 studies information acquisition, Section 4 studies disclosure incentives.
Section 5 puts the two decisions together. Section 6 considers a more general contest success
function and Section 7 discusses the eﬀect of mandatory disclosure policy. Section 8 studies the
robustness of our ﬁndings with respect to the discriminatoriness of the competition. Section 9
concludes.
Literature Review
The nearest antecedent to our paper is Kovenock, Morath, and M¨ unster (2010), who study
information disclosure between ﬁrms when the contest outcome is very sensitive to contest
expenditures. Our concerns are with both information disclosure and acquisition and how they
relate to the sensitivity of the contest outcome to expenditures. Baik and Shogren (1995) study
the eﬀects of spying and information acquisition in contest games. To gain tractability, they
abstract away from strategic considerations in the expenditures themselves – essentially, the
contest game is decision-theoretic. Our analysis, however, highlights the importance of the
strategic interaction between acquisition/disclosure and contest expenditures. Indeed, our main
result is driven by the fact that acquisition changes the behavior not just of the party gaining
new information but also the party whose information was disclosed.
Information acquisition and/or disclosure decisions have been studied in three diﬀerent but
complementary settings to ours: Cournot and Bertrand competition, auctions and agency theory.
Vives (1984), Li (1985), Shapiro (1986) and Darrough (1993) amongst others study information
transmission in the context of Cournot and Bertrand competition. With contests we add a
third possible form of competition between ﬁrms. Other papers, e.g. Persico (2000) or Eso and
Szentes (2007) have analyzed the incentives to acquire or disclose information either about one’s
private value or about a common value in auction settings. With our analysis of an all-pay
3auction we complement this literature, while adding a diﬀerent dimension with the analysis of
non-fully discriminating contests. One of our main results is to show that it can be optimal for a
lobbying group or ﬁrm to remain ignorant about the valuation its rival places on “winning” the
contest. The strategic value of ignorance has also been shown in the context of agency theory.
A principal may beneﬁt from ignorance as it alters the agent’s incentives to exert eﬀort. The
agent may beneﬁt as well, as ignorance may make it harder for the principal to extract rents.
Papers highlighting these eﬀects are for example Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Barros (1997)
and Kessler (1998). While this literature focusses on vertical relationships between two distinct
parties, in our model the focus is on competing parties in a horizontal relationship.
Information transmission from lobbies to the policy maker through lobbying has been studied
for example by Potters and van Winden (1992), Lagerl¨ of (2007) and Grossman and Helpman
(2001). The focus of this literature is on the welfare implications of lobbying when lobbyists
have private information which is relevant to the policy maker and the policy maker attempts
to learn by observing lobbying expenditures. In contrast we focus on information transmission
between lobbyists and its implications for welfare and eﬃciency, and highlight consequences for
disclosure policy.
Information disclosure has also been studied in the context of goods markets, e.g. Jovanovic
(1982), Milgrom (2008) and Daughety and Reinganum (2008), where the focus is on whether
markets lead to optimal incentives for ﬁrms to disclose information about the quality of their
goods. This literature revolves around the trade-oﬀ that disclosure is beneﬁcial for the consumer
but costly to the seller. In contrast, we show that mandatory disclosure can be harmful even
without direct monetary costs, purely through its strategic eﬀect.
Finally, our paper is of course also related to the literature on asymmetric information
in contests (e.g. Hurley and Shogren (1998), Katsenos (2009), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) or
Hernandez-Lagos and Tadelis (2011)), and the role of commitment in contests (e.g. Dixit (1987),
Baik and Shogren (1992), Morgan (2003), Morgan and V´ ardy (2007), Yildirim (2005) and Fu
(2006)) though the form of commitment typically consists of committing to a sequence of moves.
In contrast we study contests where players are able to commit to certain informational regimes.
2 The Model
While we couch the model in the context of lobbying, it is easily translated into other competitive
situations.2 Consider two lobbying groups i = A,B who vie for favorable legislation to be passed.
2We can easily reframe our model in terms of another introductory example – political campaigns. Two
politicians i = A,B are campaigning for a political oﬃce. The political oﬃce yields i a value vi while failure
yields a value normalized to zero. To aﬀect the chances of success, each politician chooses some amount of
campaign expenditures xi. The chance that i is successful depends on the contest success function (CSF) deﬁned
in equation 2. The talent of the incumbent politician is more or less common knowledge and hence his value for
oﬃce vA is known. For the newcomer we assume the value is low with probability q and high else.
4Success yields lobby i a value vi while failure yields zero. To aﬀect the chances of success, each






If both groups choose zero lobbying eﬀort (xi = 0) a coin toss determines success. Lobbyists are
risk-neutral with a constant marginal cost of eﬀort normalized to one. While each lobbying group
knows its own valuation for success, information about the other party diﬀers. In particular, the
valuation of group A is commonly known while group B has private information about its value.
One can think of this situation arising when group A is an “incumbent” who has engaged in
many past ﬁghts over related issues while group B is a newcomer or, alternatively, where publicly
available information makes it easy to estimate A’s value while B’s value, perhaps being more
subjective, is harder for outsiders to estimate. For simplicity, we assume that B’s value is
binary—it is either low, vB = vL, with probability q or high, vB = vH, with the complementary
probability. In Appendix F, we show that qualitatively similar results are obtained when B’s















We focus on the case where there is uncertainty as to which lobbying group has the higher
valuation, i.e., when vA ∈ [vL,vH]. Furthermore we assume that the policy is valuable enough
for all lobbying groups to choose strictly positive lobbying eﬀort.
3 Information Acquisition
In this section we consider the incentives to acquire information about one’s opponent before the
contest. In terms of our model, suppose that it were costless for group A to acquire a credible
report as to B’s valuation before the start of the contest and this decision is common knowledge.
Afterwards the contest described in Section 2 takes place. One might be tempted to draw an
analogy with a bargaining situation. In eﬀect, A and B are negotiating (through their eﬀorts) on
who will receive the valuable legislative prize. The usual advice in such situations is to “know
thy enemy”. That is, group A should gather as much information as possible about group
B, including its valuation. This information will enable it to make the best possible decision
regarding its negotiation strategy, which can now be type-speciﬁc. Since information gathering
is costless, it seems obvious that the optimal strategy is complete information gathering.
5Where the analogy breaks down is in the form of the “negotiation” between the two parties.
Here, success will be determined by performance in an imperfectly discriminating contest; thus,
there is an integrative as well as distributive aspect to the “negotiation.” In particular, both
lobbying groups beneﬁt if lobbying eﬀorts are more muted and, since only relative lobbying
eﬀorts determine the outcome, equilibrium success probabilities would be unaﬀected if both
sides could agree to scale down their eﬀorts.
But how can ignorance enable the lobbying groups to scale down eﬀort? Consider a lobbying
group A which has a valuation above the average of lobbying group B. If it knew for sure it faces
a strong group B, competition between the similarly strong groups would be very intense. But
the chance to encounter a much weaker group B diminishes A’s investment incentive, and hence
also the strong group B’s reaction because from its view investments are strategic complements.
On the other hand, A overinvests against a weak group B to increase its chances in case its
opponent turns out to be strong. The weak group B will react to this discouragement by
lowering its investment because its investments are strategic substitutes. By optimally choosing
to remain ignorant about lobbying group B’s valuation, A can on the one hand discourage a
weaker rival and on the other hand appease a stronger rival, thereby softening the competition
between the two lobbies. Thus, unlike a decision-theoretic or negotiation context, rent-seeking
competition between the two parties creates a value to ignorance.
A sharp illustration of this intuition may be seen for the case where group A has diﬀuse
priors (i.e. q = 1/2). Here we show that, when group A is strong compared to B, it prefers
to remain ignorant while when it is weak, it seeks information to mitigate this disadvantage.
Formally,
Proposition 1. If lobbying group A is relatively strong compared to group B (vA >
√
vLvH) it
strictly prefers not to acquire any information about B’s value while a relatively weak lobbying
group A (vA <
√
vLvH) always acquires costless information about group B.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition behind the value to ignorance graphically. It shows the best
response functions of both groups when A knows the valuation of group B. Optimal lobbying
expenditures under complete information are given where the best response functions intersect.
If group A’s value is relatively high, its lobbying eﬀort under ignorance (vertical line) is higher
than under complete information in case it faces the low value opponent (left panel), while the
opposite is true against the high value opponent (right panel). We can directly see that this
beneﬁts A by decreasing both its opponents’ lobbying eﬀorts.3
3Technically speaking, our results are due to the non-monotonicity of reaction functions. This implies that
eﬀorts are strategic complements for the favorite while they are strategic substitutes for the underdog, where in
our set-up the favorite is the group with the higher valuation. See Dixit (1987) for a discussion.























Figure 1: The left panel shows the full-information best response functions when lobbying group A faces
a weak opponent, the right panel when it faces a strong opponent. xAI
A denotes the lobbying eﬀort of A
under ignorance. Under ignorance (dot) both types of B expend less than under full information (square).
Softening competition through ignorance does not always work. If group A’s valuation is
below the geometric mean of vB, ignorance increases competition. A weak group A invests little
when facing a much stronger group B while it ﬁghts hard against the just slightly weaker group
B, where competition is more equal. By staying ignorant A ﬁnds itself overinvesting in case it
faces the stronger group B, which reacts to this threat with an increase in investment. At the
same time it underinvests in case it faces the weak group B, which also reacts with an increase
in investment, sensing a good opportunity. Hence a weak lobbying group A always acquires
costless information.
Note that if group A’s decision to acquire information were not observable to group B, A
would always choose to acquire information about B’s value. Deviating from ignorance to in-
formation acquisition enables A to play a best response while B does not change its behavior
as the deviation is unobservable. In equilibrium this is anticipated by group B and the contest
always takes place under complete information. In this sense observability is a form of com-
mitment opportunity that enables A to commit to a beneﬁcial action which would otherwise
not be feasible, as it is not in its complete-information best response. In fact, commitment to
ignorance can have a similar eﬀect as pre-commitment of eﬀort. If group A had the opportunity
to be a Stackelberg leader, meaning it could pre-commit its contest eﬀort in a way observable
to B, it would choose to overinvest relative to simultaneous moves against a lower-valued rival
while it would choose to underinvest against a higher-valued rival. Both rivals react to this
precommitment with a decrease in investment (Dixit (1987)).
74 Information Disclosure
Lobbying group A’s decision to stay ignorant could well be obsolete if group B can credibly
disclose its value to A. In fact, it is not clear what happens if A and B disagree about whether
B’s value should be revealed. In this section we explore the other side of the information
transmission decision and focus on group B’s incentives to disclose its valuation to A. There
are many possibilities how disclosure could work. As a ﬁrst step we assume that lobbying group
B has the opportunity to commit ex-ante, before learning its value, to a disclosure policy. In
case it chooses to disclose, it discloses its value truthfully and without cost to A after learning
it and before the start of the contest. In this sense we give B a commitment opportunity to
maximize its ex-ante welfare. At the end of this section we discuss this assumption and analyze
an alternative model where B can only use a costly signal to signal its value to A.
Even though disclosure enables the opponent to make a more informed decision, this does not
necessarily mean that the disclosing group is hurt by this. For example if the opponent learns
that the group has a much higher valuation it will optimally react by lowering its expenditures,
as its chances of success are so slim, and this is beneﬁcial for both groups. On the other hand, if
the opponent learns the lobbying group has a very low valuation, it might also ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
to lower its expenditures, as not much is needed for success. Disclosing a similar valuation on
the other hand makes competition ﬁercer.
If the disclosure decision is made ex-ante, we ﬁnd that information is only disclosed when B
faces a relatively weak group A. Formally,
Proposition 2. Assume lobbying group B does not know its value yet but is given the opportu-
nity to commit ex-ante to a disclosure policy. If lobbying group B expects to be relatively weak
compared to lobbying group A (
√
vLvH < vA) it strictly prefers to commit to non-disclosure.
On the other hand, a lobbying group B with a high expected valuation (
√
vLvH > vA) always
commits to disclose its value.
Proof. See appendix.
To make the intuition behind Proposition 2 clearer let us ﬁrst look at the incentives of a
high- and a low-value lobbying group B separately. A high-value lobbying group B will prefer
disclosure if it can discourage lobbying group A from expending lobbying eﬀort. This is the case
whenever it is relatively strong, or vA <
√
vLvH. For vA ≥
√
vLvH disclosing makes A more
aggressive, as it learns that its opponent is of similar strength. The opposite is true for a weak
lobbying group B. When facing a strong group A it prefers to disclose its valuation, as A will
react with lower lobbying eﬀort. If A is weak on the other hand, revealing its valuation makes
competition stronger, as A learns that it is facing a similarly strong opponent. The weak and
the strong lobbying group B’s incentives are never aligned. If disclosing is beneﬁcial for one, it
8is harmful to the other. From an ex-ante point of view, before learning its valuation, the strong
lobbying groups’ interests always dominate though. The reason is that an increase in success
probability in case the value is high is worth more than in case the value turns out to be low.
Notice that the conditions for information disclosure/withholding in Proposition 2 are iden-
tical to those in Proposition 1 when group A is determining whether to pursue this information.
That is, despite competing with one another, both groups agree on information revelation. We
formalize this observation in Corollary 1 in Section 5.
Ex-ante commitment to a disclosure policy is an interesting benchmark but might not always
be feasible. Also costless and truthful revelation can be an unrealistic assumption in some
settings. To test the robustness of our results, we consider an alternative model. Let us assume
that disclosure of the lobbying group’s value is costly and not veriﬁable. Instead, a lobbying
group has the option of sending a costly signal in order to try to inform A of its value. We
assume that costs of the signal si are linear, c(si) = si, i = H,L, and signaling takes place
before the start of the contest. Then we ﬁnd:
Proposition 3. After lobbying group B learns its valuation and given the chance to send a
costly signal before the contest to group A, only a high-value lobbying group credibly reveals its
valuation. This is only proﬁtable in a situation where group A is relatively weak (
√
vLvH > vA).
Otherwise no information is disclosed.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for this proposition carries over from the one for Proposition 2. A lobbying
group with a high valuation stands to gain more from a decrease in A’s lobbying eﬀort. This
means that it is willing to expend more signaling eﬀort than a low-value group. If it is in
its interest, it will always be able to imitate a low-value group’s signal so that no information
is disclosed. Hence against a strong group A information will never be disclosed because it
is detrimental to the high-value group, while against a weak group A the high-value group is
willing to credibly disclose its valuation through the costly signal. Our results are in line with
the results in Katsenos (2009) who analyzes costly signaling in a lottery contest with two-sided
asymmetric information and two possible types of valuations, vH and vL for both parties. He
ﬁnds that separating equilibria only exist, when the probability to face a strong opponent is
suﬃciently low. Our result complements this ﬁnding in a one-sided asymmetric information
setting where vA can be diﬀerent from vH and vL.
5 Information Transmission
So far we have analyzed the lobbying groups’ disclosure and acquisition decisions separately. Now







































































































































































t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
Figure 2: Sequence of moves
In Section 7 we then compare our ﬁndings to lobbying under mandatory disclosure policy.
The game proceeds as follows: Prior to the start of lobbying, each lobbying group engages in
information disclosure/acquisition decisions; that is, group A decides whether to pursue credible
information about B’s valuation while group B simultaneously decides on its disclosure policy.
Following information acquisition/disclosure, both lobbying groups simultaneously choose lob-
bying eﬀorts and payoﬀs are resolved. Figure 2 illustrates the ﬂow of the game.
We assume that lobbying group B has not learned its valuation when deciding on information
disclosure. In Proposition 3 we showed that our results extend to an alternative set-up where
B has learned its valuation and has the possibility to send a costly signal to group A. Then if
both lobbying groups agree that information should be exchanged (B prefers disclosure and A
acquisition) A will learn the value of group B. If on the other hand both lobbying groups agree
not to disclose (B prefers non-disclosure and A ignorance), no information is transmitted. What
is not so clear is what happens if A and B do not agree. For example A might want to acquire
information about B’s value, but B might not be willing to disclose it. Or B might want to
disclose its value while A does not want to acquire it. The payoﬀ in these situations which we
denote by πD
i , could be equal to πCI
i , or πAI
i or anything in between depending on how exactly
information transmission works. For our results in this section we do not need to make any








Consider again the case with group A having diﬀuse priors (i.e. q = 1/2). Then the lobbying
groups always agree on information transmission between them. Formally,
Corollary 1. If lobbying group B expects to be relatively weak compared to lobbying group A
(
√
vLvH < vA) both lobbying groups agree not to transfer any information while if lobbying group
B expects to have a high valuation compared to A (
√
vLvH > vA) both agree on disclosure.







i for vA >
√
vHvL, i = A,B. For vA =
√
vHvL both groups are
10indiﬀerent. We have the following payoﬀ matrix.












i , multiple Nash equilibria are possible. For example even though πCI
i >
πAI
i , i = A,B in case vA <
√
vHvL, staying ignorant and not disclosing is a Nash equilibrium






. This equilibrium though
is Pareto dominated by the one where A acquires information and B discloses. In this sense
the lobbying parties, given a chance to coordinate, would always agree on the Pareto superior
equilibrium. This is also the only trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Note that this is also the
unique equilibrium when parties can decide sequentially on information transmission.
We ﬁnd the lobbying groups’ incentives to be always aligned.The reason for this is that there
exist gains from coordination in the form of reduced competition. By coordinating, both parties
can save on lobbying expenditures.
This ﬁnding can also be related to the literature on sequential moves and pre-commitment of
eﬀort in contests. Corollary 1 is in a sense analogous to the ﬁndings in Baik and Shogren (1992)
and Leininger (1993), who analyze the choice of the order of moves in sequential rent-seeking
contests. They ﬁnd that it is in the interest of both lobbying groups to choose the sequence of
moves where the least eﬀorts are expended. This means that both groups always prefer the weak
group to go ﬁrst and pre-commit contest eﬀort. It chooses a low lobbying eﬀort and the strong
group reacts with lower lobbying eﬀort as well. Even though the weak group ends up winning
less often, it is compensated by lower lobbying costs. When choosing whether to disclose a
similar logic applies. Staying ignorant can have a similar eﬀect as moving ﬁrst, if it enables A to
move closer to its Stackelberg point. As we have shown, this is the case for a relatively strong
lobbying group A. By staying ignorant it can credibly reduce its investment against the high-
valuation lobbying group B who will react by reducing its expenditures as well. Interestingly
in this set-up the strategic complementarities from facing a high-valued rival always dominate,
and hence agreement is possible, even though eﬀorts are strategic substitutes for the low-valued
lobbying group B.
Our results require very little structure in determining how exactly information transmission
works. The only essential prerequisite is some form of commitment opportunity. In reality,
this could take many forms. For example, one purpose of trade associations is to facilitate
information exchange (e.g. Kirby (1988) or Vives (1990)). Members commit themselves to share
their private information with the help of the trade association, while for non-members it will
be much harder to reveal and receive credible information. Another example of institutionalized
11information exchange are strategic marriages. A strategic marriage policy was pursued by many
houses of European rulers during the Renaissance and thereafter. The probably best known
example is the House of Habsburg’s strategic marriage to Spain and Italy. Among other things
these strategic marriages can serve as commitments to disclose credible information to and
acquire credible information about other empires. Another nice historical example about the
voluntary exchange of credible information can be found in Schelling (1960), “[t]he ancients
exchanged hostages, drank wine from the same glass to demonstrate the absence of poison, met
in public places to inhibit the massacre of one by the other, and even deliberately exchanged spies
to facilitate transmittal of authentic information”. Our analysis provides a rationale for this:
exchanging authentic information can decrease the ﬁerceness of conﬂict, something that is good
for both parties.
6 More General Contest Success Function
So far we have assumed that the lobbying process can be represented by a simple lottery contest.
In order to show the robustness of our results, in this section we assume the political process
can be represented by a more general CSF of the following form:
pi (xi,xj) =
f (xi)
f (xi) + f (xj)
(2)
where f0 > 0 and f00 ≤ 0.4
As we have seen in the previous section, whether ignorance is bliss for the lobbying groups
is determined by whether or not group A’s value is above the average of group B’s valuations.
Proposition 1 shows though, that it is not the arithmetic average; rather the decision to acquire
or disclose information turns on the geometric mean of B’s value. Next we show that such a
critical value of lobbying group A’s valuation, let us denote it by b vA, exists more generally.
Lemma 1. For every q, there exists a value b vA ∈ [vL,vH] such that, if vA = b vA, lobbying
group A is indiﬀerent between acquiring information or not, and lobbying group B is indiﬀerent
between disclosing information or not.
Proof. See appendix.
To illustrate the intuition for the proof of this lemma, assume A knows its opponent. When
A faces a weak opponent B, a relatively small lobbying eﬀort will basically guarantee success
for A. With an increase in B’s value, A increases its optimal lobbying eﬀort until both groups
have an equal value. Here competition is at its ﬁercest. Now an increase in B’s value will start
to discourage A from investing, until at one point B becomes so strong that A invests barely
4This is a standard contest success function, see Skaperdas (1996) for an axiomatization.
12anything. This logic implies that there will always be two possible values of group B, one larger
than A’s, one smaller, such that A expends exactly the same lobbying eﬀort. If group B has
exactly these values, vL and vH, A’s behavior will be unchanged whether it knows B’s value or
not.
It is tempting to reason from Lemma 1 that Propositions 1 and 2 hold for more general prior
probabilities of B’s values vL and vH and more general lobbying technologies. Indeed, we can
generalize Propositions 1 and 2 as well as Corollary 1 locally around the critical value b vA.
Proposition 4. In a neighborhood of b vA, if lobbying group B expects to be relatively weak com-
pared to lobbying group A (b vA < vA) both lobbying groups agree not to transfer any information
while if lobbying group B expects to have a high valuation compared to A (b vA > vA) both agree
on disclosure.
Proof. See appendix.
Is there a reason why Proposition 4 might not always hold globally, as does Corollary 1? It
can be shown that under certain circumstances there can be disagreement between the lobbying
groups. The reason is that the critical value b vA for Lemma 1 is not always the only critical
value for group A. To illustrate, take a very strong lobbying group A with a value close to vH
and assume that the probability of facing a strong group B is small. Then group A’s lobbying
eﬀort under ignorance is similar to the lobbying eﬀort knowing it is facing a weak group B.
But if B happens to be strong and A were ignorant, it would underinvest by a large amount.
Even though this leads the strong group to reduce its eﬀort, this is not optimal for group A.
In fact, there is an optimal degree of underinvestment against a stronger opponent. If A had
the opportunity to precommit lobbying eﬀort, this would be the eﬀort level it would optimally
choose, the so-called Stackelberg point. Ignorance can enable lobbying group A to move closer to
this optimal eﬀort in certain situations. In other situations A will surpass the Stackelberg point
under ignorance, as in the example above. If A surpasses the Stackelberg point by too much,
acquiring information is the optimal strategy. Consequently, there exist situations like the one
described above where the two lobbying groups will not agree on information transmission.
7 Mandatory Disclosure Policy
Transparency policy is a topic of high relevance in many political debates around the world. For
example in the U.S., transparency laws have been passed regulating lobbying, political campaign-
ing or ﬁnancial accounting of ﬁrms. A large part of the U.S. economy is hence aﬀected through
transparency laws. Thus it is important to understand all possible consequences of mandatory
disclosure policy. In competitive environments like the ones mentioned above, transparency pol-
icy can aﬀect the nature and outcome of competition. Here we take a closer look at exactly this
13eﬀect. In the previous section we saw that typically the competitors agree on whether to disclose
information between themselves. In many cases they agree not to disclose any information to
their mutual beneﬁt. Transparency policy, on the other hand, forces the competing parties to
disclose certain information to the public, and hence also to their competitors.
We focus our analysis on two outcome variables: expected aggregate lobbying eﬀorts and
expected allocative eﬃciency. It is typically in the interest of a society to keep lobbying eﬀorts
low, since lobbying activities are not directly productive but serve only to inﬂuence policy. In
our model this is captured by the fact that by scaling down eﬀorts proportionally both groups
still win the contest with identical probability. This decrease in lobbying investment can be
used for directly productive activities. Of course, in a frictionless world one could argue that
markets would always allocate these funds eﬃciently. In reality, this is certainly not always
the case. Furthermore there is also a misallocation of non-monetary resources, as for example
human capital, and hence reducing lobbying eﬀorts seems a reasonably aim. It is also in the
interest of a society to have the probability that a law or bill which has a relatively high social
value be passed as large as possible. This social value is represented in our analysis by the
lobbying groups’ valuations. We implicitly assume that all individuals aﬀected by the policy
are part of one of the two lobbying groups, for example a “pro” and a “contra” group. Inside
each group there are no transaction costs and no externalities, and thus the groups’ valuations
for the policy perfectly reﬂect societal preferences. This can be seen as an approximation for
a situation where both groups face similar free-rider problems.5 Consequently it is in society’s
interest that a higher valued lobbying group has the best chances to succeed. We will refer to
this as expected allocative eﬃciency henceforth.
Mandatory disclosure policy can take many diﬀerent forms, ranging from disclosure of infor-
mation about actions (e.g. expenditures or eﬀorts) to disclosure of characteristics (e.g. valua-
tions, costs or productivity), or any mix thereof. Depending on its form, mandatory disclosure
will impact competition to diﬀerent degrees. In this paper we consider disclosure policy about
the competitors’ characteristics. Transparency about actions can reveal something about charac-
teristics, but does not necessarily have to (in technical terms there can be pooling or separating
equilibria). Thus our analysis also applies to disclosure about actions, whenever information
about characteristics is revealed.
Let us resume the example of lobbying introduced in Section 2 and ﬁrst assume that we
are interested in keeping the expected wastefulness of the lobbying competition low and it is
irrelevant for society which lobbying group is successful. This could for example be the case in
rent-seeking contests. We then get the following result.
Proposition 5. Expected aggregate eﬀort is lower under
5Free-rider problems in group contests with public goods prizes are discussed for example in Esteban and Ray
(2001) or Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2010).
14• information disclosure if lobbying group A is relatively weak (vA ≤
√
vHvL),




As foreshadowed in Section 5 we ﬁnd that if the uninformed lobbying group is relatively
strong, mandatory information disclosure makes the lobbying process more wasteful in expec-
tation. In addition, we have shown in Corollary 1 and Proposition 4 that in many situations
the lobbying groups voluntarily agree not to transfer any information. In these cases a “laissez-
faire” policy leads to less wasteful competition. If we assume that information can only be
transferred when it is in lobbying group B’s interest to disclose its information, we can conclude
the following.
Corollary 2. If society is interested in keeping lobbying expenditures low a “laissez-faire” policy
is preferable to a policy of mandatory disclosure.
Next we consider expected allocative eﬃciency. We deﬁne expected allocative eﬃciency as
the probability that the lobbying group with the highest valuation wins the lobbying contest.
Then we can show
Proposition 6. Expected allocative eﬃciency is greater under
• information disclosure if lobbying group A is relatively weak (vA ≤
√
vHvL),




This ﬁnding also relates to the literature on sequential contests. As we discussed in Section 3,
asymmetric information enables the uninformed lobbying group to act similar to a Stackelberg
leader when it is suﬃciently strong relative to the informed lobbying group. Morgan (2003)
ﬁnds that sequential rent-seeking contests dominate simultaneous ones in terms of eﬃciency.
Hence if asymmetric information enables A to get closer to its Stackelberg point, which is true
for vA >
√
vHvL, it also improves eﬃciency. Together with the results in Corollary 1 and
Proposition 5 we ﬁnd the following.
Corollary 3. Assume that society is interested in increasing expected allocative eﬃciency and
keeping expected wastefulness of the lobbying competition low. Then a “laissez-faire” policy is
always weakly superior, independent of the relative weights the policy maker places on the two
goals.
15With a completely altruistic policy maker, transparency is clearly beneﬁcial for eﬃciency.
Only if it is known which policy is the best, can it be chosen by the policy maker. If the policy
maker follows his self-interests and bases his decision on lobbying eﬀorts, transparency will
have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the lobbying groups, sometimes favoring the “weaker”, sometimes
the “stronger” one. As we have shown, this can lead to another undesirable side-eﬀect of
transparency policy, a decrease in expected allocative eﬃciency. At the same time, our result
has the potential to explain the emergence of mandatory disclosure policies, even though shown
to be ineﬃcient. A policy maker interested in maximizing his rent-seeking revenues always
weakly prefers mandatory disclosure to voluntary disclosure.
Furthermore, note that disclosure policy which does not aﬀect current lobbying competition,
in other words disclosure with a suﬃcient time lag or with “soft” disclosure requirements which
do not reveal anything about the competitors’ characteristics, does not have these detrimental
eﬀects. At the same time it can still aﬀord possible beneﬁts through increased accountability
and better informed voters. In this respect our ﬁndings help evaluate calls for an increase in
transparency, as for example by the Sunlight Foundation in the U.S.. Coming back to our
introductory example, the demand for real-time lobbying disclosure, our ﬁndings imply that
even apart from the direct costs of increased transparency such as bureaucratic expenses, this
policy is likely to have indirect costs in terms of an increase in expected wastefulness and a
decrease in expected allocative eﬃciency of lobbying competition, which have to be traded oﬀ
against the additional beneﬁts.6
8 Noisiness of the Contest and the Scope for Agreement
So far we have implicitly assumed that lobbying expenditures do not perfectly determine the
outcome of the competition. By spending more in the contest a lobbying group can increase its
chances to succeed, but there always remains some uncertainty. Put diﬀerently, the lobbying
group with the lower expenditures still has a non-zero chance of success – the lobbying process
is at least somewhat noisy. There are diﬀerent reasons this might be true. For example, policy
makers may have preferences over political outcomes unknown to the lobbying groups, or face
imperfectly observable constraints. Another reason for a noisy lobbying process from the lob-
6There may be another negative eﬀect of transparency, not captured in our model. Higher transparency makes
direct transfers of funds from lobbying groups to policy makers less likely, because this would be considered bribery
or corruption, which is typically illegal. Of course, this does not mean that lobbying groups stop exerting pressure.
Rather they (partially) substitute away from transfers to legal sources of eﬀort, which are usually labor intensive.
But this has direct negative consequences for eﬃciency and wastefulness of the competition. While bribing is
purely distributive and therefore funds are not “wasted”, labor intensive lobbying directly wastes resources and
hence is an allocative problem. Therefore, it can be argued from a wastefulness perspective that bribery has
an advantage over lobbying, what is in line with for example Lambsdorﬀ (2002). Consequently, transparency
may not only increase lobbying eﬀort, but is likely to inﬂuence the composition of lobbying eﬀort in a socially
undesirable way.
16bying groups’ perspective is that lobbying eﬀorts are only imperfectly observable by the policy
maker. This could be due to the complexity of the subject so that it is diﬃcult for lobbyists to
communicate their concerns properly, or because it is not clear ex-ante what the best strategy
to approach a political decision maker is and which consequences of the favored bill to highlight.
We have captured this uncertainty by using a non-deterministic CSF of the ratio form, as
deﬁned in equation (2). We now consider a CSF which can be interpreted as the limiting
case when noise vanishes completely, the all-pay auction. It represents a situation where the
political process is very sensitive to lobbying eﬀort and where the lobbying group with the
highest expenditure wins with certainty.7 This higher sensitivity implies higher marginal returns
to lobbying eﬀort and therefore increases the ﬁerceness of the competition. It is interesting to
consider this situation as an extreme case, because it is implicitly assumed that policy makers
do not have any private preferences about the political outcomes, do not face any constraints
and the process of communication between the lobbying groups and the policy maker is free of
misunderstandings and noise. In short, the policy maker bases his decision solely on lobbying
expenditures. The next proposition shows how an absence of noisiness inﬂuences the incentives
to coordinate on information transmission.
Proposition 7. When the political process takes the form of an all-pay auction
1. disclosing information is weakly dominated for lobbying group B,
2. staying ignorant is weakly dominated for lobbying group A,
3. the lobbying groups’ incentives are never aligned and therefore they will never agree on
transferring information voluntarily.
Proof. See appendix.8
This result reveals that the contest’s degree of sensitivity to rent-seeking eﬀorts inﬂuences
when the lobbying groups agree on information transmission. In contrast to ratio form contests,
in a fully discriminating contest the lobbying groups’ incentives are never aligned. The informed
group never discloses its information while the uninformed group always takes an opportunity
to acquire information. Because of the ﬁerceness of competition there is no scope for agreement.
Consider the lobbying groups’ incentives separately. Why does lobbying group B never
beneﬁt from disclosing its valuation? Under a noisy political process, by disclosing its value,
a strong group B discourages a weak group A from investing. This does not work when the
political process is fully discriminating. By disclosing information, a strong lobbying group will
7The standard references analyzing all-pay auctions are Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries
(1993, 1996), and Krishna and Morgan (1997).
8A proof for part 2 of the Proposition has ﬁrst been given in Kovenock, Morath, and M¨ unster (2010) for
two-sided asymmetric information and a continuous distribution of types.
17only secure itself a payoﬀ equal to the diﬀerence in valuations between itself and its opponent.
All other rents are dissipated through competition. With asymmetric information competition
is less ﬁerce and it can in addition earn informational rents. In fact, it can secure itself the
exact same payoﬀ with one-sided asymmetric information (by marginally overbidding group A’s
valuation) and might even do better. Technically speaking, in all-pay auctions both reaction
functions are monotonically increasing until the valuation of the weakest lobbying group so there
will be no discouragement eﬀect in the relevant range.
Why is there no value to ignorance? When policy makers are perfectly responsive to lobbying
expenditures, there is no advantage to pre-committing lobbying expenditures, as has been shown
for example in Konrad and Leininger (2007). In fact, a low-valuation lobbying group is indif-
ferent with respect to timing while a high-valuation group prefers to decide after its opponent
chooses its expenditures. Hence the advantage from ignorance highlighted under an imperfectly
discriminating political process does not apply this setting — ignorance cannot dampen com-
petition to the beneﬁt of both parties, it only beneﬁts the opponent. Hence lobbying group A
always acquires information.
What are the consequences for disclosure policy? First of all, Proposition 7 shows that
lobbying groups don’t agree on disclosure and hence it is no longer clear what happens under
a laissez-faire transparency rule. Furthermore, a reduction in expected aggregate eﬀort and
an increase in expected allocative eﬃciency, two possible objectives of society, are no longer
necessarily compatible as we show now in an example. We ﬁnd that expected aggregate eﬀort is
typically smaller under complete information when A’s value is not too close to either vH or vL
and under asymmetric information else. Expected allocative eﬃciency is typically greater under
asymmetric information except if vA is relatively small and q is relatively large. The reason is
the following. Asymmetric information has two eﬀects on allocative eﬃciency when the policy
maker is perfectly responsive to lobbying expenditures. On the one hand it stratiﬁes the range
of eﬀorts of lobbying group B. A low-valuation group chooses its investment from an interval of
the form [0,x] while the high-valuation group chooses from [x,x]. In contrast, under complete
information they choose from the interval [0,xi], i = H,L. This is beneﬁcial for eﬃciency. On
the other hand we showed that lobbying group B beneﬁts from informational rents. Especially
when A is very likely to face a low-valuation opponent and vA is close to vL, this becomes
important for eﬃciency. B’s informational advantage will lead to a low-valuation type winning
too often, decreasing eﬃciency. In theses cases the detrimental eﬀect of asymmetric information
dominates and expected allocative eﬃciency is higher under complete information.
Figure 3 illustrates this for vL = 1 and vH = 2. In darkgray regions complete information is
optimal while in lightgray regions asymmetric information is preferred. So decreasing expected
aggregate eﬀort often implies decreasing expected allocative eﬃciency. We can draw the following
conclusions regarding mandatory and voluntary disclosure policy.
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Figure 3: Aggregate eﬀort (panel a)) and eﬃciency (panel b)).
Corollary 4. Policy makers who are perfectly responsive to the inﬂuence of lobbyists make
decentralized agreement impossible. In these circumstances, neither a laissez-faire transparency
rule nor mandated disclosure is optimal in our framework. Furthermore, achieving an increase
in expected allocative eﬃciency and a decrease in expected aggregate eﬀort through disclosure
policy becomes unlikely as these two goals are often in conﬂict.
Summarizing our results, we ﬁnd diﬀerential eﬀects of transparency policy on lobbying com-
petition depending on the noisiness of the political process. While under a suﬃciently noisy
political process a laissez-faire policy leads to the best outcome in terms of expected aggregate
eﬀort as well as allocative eﬃciency, this need not be true under a perfectly discriminating po-
litical process. Here the eﬀect of transparency policy is ambiguous and no general results can
be obtained to guide policy decisions.
9 Conclusion
How do we evaluate the recent proposals for more transparency in U.S. lobbying? If transparency
were free to implement, would more transparency always be better for society? Even though
we cannot give a conclusive answer to these questions, our analysis highlights a side-eﬀect of
transparency policy which has been absent from the policy debate so far. We show how an
increase in transparency can lead to an increase in the wastefulness of lobbying competition
and at the same time to a decrease in the probability that the lobbying group with the most
pressing interests succeeds. Furthermore we show that in the absence of mandatory disclosure
policy, competitors often agree whether or not to share information and this decision reduces
wastefulness and increases allocative eﬃciency. Our results have implications beyond lobbying.
These considerations hold weight for the analysis of transparency policy in other competitive
settings like political campaigning or ﬁnancial accounting of rival ﬁrms.
19While we focused in our assessment of the welfare implication of transparency on an envi-
ronment in which eﬀort is considered wasteful, there are other environments in which eﬀort is
considered (socially) beneﬁcial. An immediate example is student’s eﬀort in school or at uni-
versity. Higher eﬀort generates better educated graduates, which is beneﬁcial for society as a
whole. Typically grades are based on relative performance (grading on a curve), so students’
competition for grades is a contest and we can apply our results. We know from Section 7 that
transparency leads in expectation to increased eﬀort. Consequently, to increase students’ eﬀorts
a transparent studying environment is likely to be helpful. This can be achieved by promot-
ing studying in groups or by testing students frequently over the term and publicizing the test
scores.
An interesting extension of our analysis would be to allow for common values. This can
be relevant in many settings. In our lobbying example the lobbyists might posses relevant
information about the value of the policy at stake, as for example when lobbying for a monopoly
position and each ﬁrm has done market research. Lobbying groups learn not only about their
opponent’s interest, but also about their own. Most importantly, to draw more precise policy
conclusions a more general model of all aﬀected parties is needed to evaluate all the possible
eﬀects of transparency policy and their interactions. For example transparency policy in lobbying
will also aﬀect the relationship between the policy maker and the general public. To combine
these factors into one model is an important avenue for future research and will allow a more
thorough evaluation of transparency policy.
20Appendix
A Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 3
A.1 Equilibrium under Full- and Asymmetric Information


















It is easily veriﬁed that A will invest more against a high-value opponent than against a low-value
one iﬀ vA >
√
vHvL. Under one-sided asymmetric information eﬀort, probability of success and
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21A.2 Acquiring Information
Let us consider lobbying group A’s incentives to acquire information. The diﬀerence in expected





































































vHvL A clearly prefers to acquire information, while for vA =
√
vHvL it is indiﬀerent.
For vA slightly larger than
√
vHvL it prefers ignorance while for vA approaching vH it might
prefer to acquire information again. This implies we have to be careful about staying in an
interior solution, in other words we need vL ≥
(1−q)2v2
AvH









Let q = 1
2. Then the diﬀerence in utility for group A between complete-information and















































We can show that this is unambiguously positive for vA <
√
vLvH and negative for vA >
√
vLvH
given that we are in an interior solution. For vH > 9vL the condition for an interior solution

















L. This is clearly strictly
negative for all vH < 9vL. For vH > 9vL we insert the highest possible vA into the expression in










which is always negative for vH > 9vL.
A.3 Disclosing Information
To see whether group B prefers to disclose or not it is suﬃcient to look at group A’s eﬀort
diﬀerence between full and asymmetric information. Since less investment of the opponent is
strictly preferred given a ﬁxed investment, it is even more so, if B can in addition optimally
react. If A invests more under complete information against B, B will clearly prefer asymmetric
22information. Deﬁne ∆xi := xCI
i −xAI




































































































vLvH A’s eﬀort is identical, while for vA >
√
vLvH A underinvests against a high-value
opponent and overinvests against a low-value one under asymmetric information. The opposite
holds true for vA <
√
vLvH. Hence it follows that for vA >
√
vLvH a high-value B prefers not
to disclose, while a low-value one prefers disclosure and vice versa for vA <
√
vLvH. Now let us
consider the ex-ante expected utility of group B when it has not yet learned its value. Deﬁne
∆πi := πCI
i − πAI
i , i = H,L,B. Then










































































































Hence for vA =
√
vLvH group B is also indiﬀerent in expectation whether to disclose or not,
while for vA >
√
vLvH it prefers not to disclose and for vA <
√
vLvH disclosure is optimal.
A.4 Signaling of Valuation
Now lobbying group B has the possibility to expend money before the contest in order to signal
its valuation. To show whether and when a separating equilibrium exists, consider the following
set up. Each group L and H can send a costly signal to A before the contest, which we denote
by si. The signal is completely unproductive and only serves the signaling objective. We assume
signaling costs are c(s) = s for both groups. The game has a separating equilibrium when it is
possible for L to send a signal which H does not want to mimic and vice versa.
We ﬁrst look at vA >
√
vLvH. In this situation we know from the above discussion that
L prefers complete information, while H is better oﬀ under asymmetric information. Hence
23L would like to signal its type and H would like to hinder it by mimicking its behavior by
setting sH = sL. A’s beliefs are the following: that any signal sB ≥ ˆ sL indicates B has
identity L, otherwise B has identity H. Because the signal is costly individual rationality
implies sB ∈ {0, ˆ sL}. In a separating equilibrium we must have that sL = ˆ sL and sH = 0.
That is, each group’s incentive compatibility (IC) constraint has to hold and no group has an




























(vA + vL)2 − ˆ sL
It is easily shown that it is not possible to ﬁnd ˆ sL > 0 fulﬁlling both inequalities simultaneously.
Hence, there does not exist a separating equilibrium when vA >
√
vLvH, and as a result no
information is transferred and both groups engage in an incomplete information contest.
Now turn to vA ≤
√
vLvH. In this case, it is H who wants so signal its identity to overcome
incomplete information, while L wants to hinder it. A believes it is facing H in the contest
whenever the signal is sB ≥ ˆ sH. Otherwise it believes it is facing L. Individual rationality
implies now sB ∈ {0, ˆ sH}. In a separating equilibrium we must have sL = 0 and sH = ˆ sH. The




























(vA + vL)2 (6)
It is now easily veriﬁed that there exists a range of signals ˆ sH for which both inequalities
hold simultaneously. From the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) it follows that the
equilibrium value of ˆ sH makes L exactly indiﬀerent between mimicking H or not, so that (5)
holds with equality. Then we have
ˆ s+
H = vL +
v2
AvH
(vA + vH)2 −
v3
L






Also, if ˆ sH = ˆ s+
H the beliefs of group A are correct and therefore there exists a separating
equilibrium. Note, however, that all values ˆ sH > ˆ s+
H also support a separating equilibrium as
long as (6) still holds. Therefore, we proved that a separating equilibrium with endogenous
information transmission exists if and only if vA ≤
√
vLvH, which proves the proposition.
24B Proof of Lemma 1
To see this, ﬁrst note that (i) reaction functions are hump-shaped and (ii) reach a maximum
where xA = xB, i.e. where the reaction function crosses the 45 degree line (for a proof see
Yildirim (2005)). Moreover, we ﬁnd an equilibrium on this line exactly when vA = vB, i.e. when
the game is symmetric. Let us denote complete-information symmetric eﬀorts for vA = vL by
xL and for vA = vH by xH. Keeping the valuation of the opponent ﬁxed, a group’s eﬀort is
strictly increasing in its own valuation. So let vA increase from vL to vH. Then the eﬀort of the
L-value type is strictly decreasing (strategic substitute) and the eﬀort of the H-value type is
strictly increasing (strategic complement). If the opponent is of the L-value type, xA increases
from xL to some xHL > xL. To the contrary, if the opponent is of the H type xA increases from
some xLH < xL to xH. Note that xH > xHL > xL > xLH, i.e. if the opponent is of the H-value
type A’s eﬀort is at the beginning lower and at the end higher compared to the L-value type.
Accordingly, by continuity there has to be some b vA ∈ (vL,vH) for which eﬀorts against both
types of the other group are identical and equal to b xA.
If vA = b vA group A will spend the same lobbying eﬀort in the complete information games
and in the asymmetric information game in equilibrium. Accordingly, both types of group B will
choose the same eﬀort independent of the informational environment, implying A’s costs and
winning probabilities are identical and thus A is indiﬀerent between both information regimes.
￿
C Proof of Proposition 4
We showed in Lemma 1 that at vA = b vA both groups are indiﬀerent between complete infor-
mation and asymmetric information. We now prove also Proposition 4. To do this we need
to analyze the derivative of both groups’ diﬀerence in utilities between complete and asymmet-
ric information. We derive some preliminary results concerning eﬀort comparative statics at
vA = b vA under both informational arrangements with respect to changes in vA. We then use
these results to prove ﬁrst the information acquisition part of the proposition and then also
information disclosure.
C.1 Preliminaries
Here we derive some comparative statics results we need later on. Because we do not have closed
form solutions for equilibrium eﬀorts we totally diﬀerentiate the systems of ﬁrst-order conditions
and use Cramer’s rule.
































































































































































































































These comparative statics show how equilibrium eﬀorts at vA = b vA react to changes in vA if
there is complete information.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Those comparative statics are the marginal change of equilibrium eﬀorts under asymmetric
27information if vA changes at b vA.
C.2 Information Acquisition
We showed in Lemma 1 that if vA = b vA group A is indiﬀerent between ignorance and complete
information. To prove the proposition we show that the derivative of the diﬀerence of utilities
of A with respect to vA is non-zero at vA = b vA. Using pi =
f(xA)
f(xA)+f(xi) and xi = xi
B, i = H,L














































































∂xL = − 1
vL <
∂pH
∂xH = − 1
vH < 0 follow
from the ﬁrst order conditions of the two groups. The derivative simpliﬁes to
∂∆πA
∂vA


























This derivative will only be zero, if a change in vA induces the same eﬀect on B’s complete-
information eﬀort as on its asymmetric information eﬀort, or if they just oﬀset each other for the
two types weighted by the probability q and their valuation. The relevant comparative statics

















follow from the shape of the CSF.
∂2pL
∂xAxL > 0 and
∂2pH
∂xAxH < 0 come from the fact that at vA = b vA
A is an underdog against an opponent with valuation vH but a favorite against an opponent
with valuation vL. Using this, the derivative of the diﬀerence in utilities equals
∂∆πA
∂vA






































































































































































Intuitively this term relates
∂xCI
AH
∂vA |vA=b vA to
∂xCI
AL
∂vA |vA=b vA. For
∂xCI
AH
∂vA |vA=b vA >
∂xCI
AL




∂vA |vA=b vA <
∂xCI
AL
∂vA |vA=b vA it will be positive. For our CSF given in equation (2)
it will always be negative. This means that starting at xL
A = xH
A a slight increase in vA will lead
to a relatively higher increase in eﬀort on the part of group A against the high-type opponent.9
Hence we ﬁnd that at vA = b vA the derivative of ∆πA is strictly negative. Thus there exist some
valuations vA > b vA where ignorance is bliss.
C.3 Information Disclosure
At vA = b vA group B is exactly indiﬀerent whether it discloses its information or not, ex-ante
as well as ex-interim, as group A always chooses the same lobbying eﬀort. Let us now vary
vA marginally from there. The derivative of the diﬀerence in the expected utility of player B









































































































where we used pi =
f(xA)
f(xA)+f(xi) and xi = xi
B, i = H,L to shorten the exposition. We know







∂xL = − 1
vL <
∂pH
∂xH = − 1
vH < 0 follow from the
ﬁrst-order conditions of the two groups. The relevant equilibrium comparative statics of eﬀorts



















































































































































> 0 which follow from the shape of the
CSF.
∂2pL
∂xAxL > 0 and
∂2pH
∂xAxH < 0 come from the fact that at vA = b vA A is an underdog against

































9Note that for more general CSF the opposite case can arise and A increases its eﬀort more against the low-type
opponent. Then there will be a value of ignorance for vA < b vA.
29Intuitively this term relates
∂xCI
AH
∂vA |vA=b vA to
∂xCI
AL
∂vA |vA=b vA. For
∂xCI
AH
∂vA |vA=b vA >
∂xCI
AL




∂vA |vA=b vA <
∂xCI
AL
∂vA |vA=b vA it will be negative. For our CSF given in equation (2)
it will always be positive. This means that starting at xL
A = xH
A a slight increase in vA will lead
to a relatively higher increase in eﬀort on the part of group A against the high-type opponent.
Hence we ﬁnd that at vA = b vA the derivative in (15) is strictly negative.
Putting together the information disclosure and information acquisition part, the proof of
the proposition follows from the proof of Corollary 1. ￿
D Proof of Propositions 5 and 6
Expected aggregate eﬀort with contest success function pi = xi











vA (((1 − q)vH + qvL)vA + vLvH)
(vA + vH)(vA + vL)
,















(1 − q) 1 √





















vA (((1 − q)vH + qvL)vA + vLvH)
(vA + vH)(vA + vL)































vHvL + vH + vL) + vHvL)
(vA + vH)(vA + vL)(qvA(vH − vL) + vL(vA + vH))
.
It is easily observed that this is positive for vA >
√
vHvL and negative otherwise hence proving
Proposition 5.
Eﬃciency implies that the informational regime should be chosen to maximize q
xA
xA+xL +
(1 − q) xH
















(vA + vH)(vA + vL)(qvA(vH − vL) + vL(vA + vH))
,
which is positive for vA <
√
vHvL and negative else. ￿
30E Proof of Proposition 7












for x ∈ [0,vj]. In the following let Fi(x;vj) indicate the bidding distribution of group i fac-
ing another group j and denote the corresponding density function by fi(x;vj). The ex-ante
expected complete information payoﬀs are
πCI




A = q (vA − vL).
Those results are standard and the proofs can be found for example in Hillman and Riley (1989)
or Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996). Using the equilibrium strategies it is easily veriﬁed




(fA(x;vL) + fL(x;vA)) xdx + (1 − q)
Z vA
0



























































































Under one-sided asymmetric information consider ﬁrst the case where vA is relatively small,




(1−q). We then ﬁnd that A’s bidding/eﬀort distribution function has a mass








vL for x ∈ [0,qvA]
vH−vA
vH + x










for x ∈ [qvA,vA].
That those distribution functions indeed characterize an equilibrium is easily veriﬁed and we
leave this to the reader (a proof is available upon request). Equilibrium payoﬀs in this case are
πAI
A = 0 < πCI
A = q (vA − vL)
πAI




vH − (1 − q)vA
vH
− qvA > πCI
L = 0.
A prefers complete information while B weakly prefers asymmetric information — the L-type
is better oﬀ while the H-type is indiﬀerent.
Expected aggregate eﬀort is equal to
XAI





A (x;vL,vH) + fAI
L
￿

































q2vA(vH − vL) + vL(vA + vH)
￿
2vHvL
and expected allocative eﬃciency is equal to
EFAI

































q2vAvH − (q − 1)vL[(q − 1)vA + 2vH]
2vHvL
.

































vL (1 − q)
qvH











for x ∈ [x,x],
where x = vL − (1 − q)vA
vL





. The corresponding expected
equilibrium payoﬀs are
πAI




A = q (vA − vL)
πAI






> vH − vA = πCI
H
πAI
L = 0 = πCI
L .
B prefers asymmetric information, since the H-type is better oﬀ while the L-type is indiﬀerent,





















vA + (q − 1)(vA + vH)((q − 1)vA(vH − 2vL) − 2vHvL)
2v2
H
and expected allocative eﬃciency equals
EFAI
















− vL((q − 1)vA + vH)2
2vAvH
2 .
To complete the proof note that when A and B disagree on information transmission, we






, the exact value depending on how
exactly information transmission works. Hence disclosing information is weakly dominated for
B and staying ignorant is weakly dominated for A. ￿
33F Continuous uniform distribution
Let us assume that B’s value is distributed uniformly on [v,v], with vA ∈ [v,v]. In case both

















































































we can solve for the equilibrium eﬀorts. Focussing on interior solutions































vA (ln[v] − ln[v]) + (v − v)
!2


























































vBxA + xA = vB − 2
√
xAvB + xA

















vA (ln[v] − ln[v]) + (v − v)
!2































vA (ln[v] − ln[v]) + (v − v)
!2
.
Now we consider the incentives to disclose or acquire information. The diﬀerence in utilities



























































vA (ln[v] − ln[v]) + (v − v)
!2
.

















































vA (ln[v] − ln[v]) + (v − v)
!2
.
These expressions are quite unwieldy and hence we illustrate the equivalents of Propositions
1 to 6 only graphically. Normalizing the lowest valuation to one, v = 1, we plot the diﬀer-
ences in utility for A as well as B (from an ex-ante) between full and asymmetric information
in Figure 4. v is plotted on the abscissa while vA is on the ordinate. We plot only valua-
tion pairs for which an interior solution exists. In the lightgray regions the lobbying groups
prefer ignorance/non-disclosure, while in the darkgray region the lobbying groups prefer to ac-
quire/disclose information. If A is relatively weak, information disclosure is favorable for both
35players while if A is relatively strong both players prefer asymmetric information exactly as in
our baseline set-up in Section 2.



























panel a) panel b) panel c)
Figure 4: Diﬀerence in expected utility for lobbying group A (panel a)) and B (panel b)). Zone of
agreement (panel c))
We ﬁnd that players generally agree whether to disclose B’s valuation. Interestingly, only in
a small region where A has an about average valuation, in other words vA is close to E[vB], the
players’ preferences diverge. In these cases B prefers disclosure while A prefers to stay ignorant
about B’s value. This can be seen in panel c) of Figure 4.
To illustrate Propositions 5 and 6 we plot the diﬀerence in expected aggregate eﬀort and
expected eﬃciency under complete and asymmetric information. Figure 5 illustrates these dif-
ferences. In the darkgray region disclosure leads to lower expected aggregate eﬀort or higher
expected allocative eﬃciency while in the lightgray region non-disclosure is preferable.


















panel a) panel b)
Figure 5: Diﬀerence in aggregate eﬀort (panel a)) and expected allocative eﬃciency (panel b)).
Overall we ﬁnd that our results under a continuous uniform distribution are remarkably
36similar to the ones under only two types of player B, vH and vL.
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